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THE “MALE PROBLEMATIC” AND THE PROBLEMS OF
FAMILY LAW: A RESPONSE TO DON BROWNING’S
“CRITICAL FAMILISM”
Linda C. McClain*
INTRODUCTION
I am grateful to Professor Don Browning for engaging with my book, The
Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility.1
Professor Browning is a prolific and thoughtful scholar as well as a prominent
participant in the marriage movement, which aims to restore a “marriage
culture” and promote the institution of marriage.2 The “critical familism”
approach to the American family debate, developed by Browning and his
colleagues in the multiyear Religion, Culture, and Family Project,3 has
contributed to the intellectual underpinning of the marriage movement. An
aim of my book is to contribute to the ongoing conversation about the place of
families—and of marriage—in our political order, as well as to enter into
constructive dialogue about family law and policy. To that end, my book takes
up and critically evaluates positions advanced by the marriage movement on
issues ranging from governmental promotion of marriage to whether family
law should extend protection to a broader range of family forms.
In this response to Professor Browning’s review,4 I will use the relationship
between “the male problematic” and the problems of family law as an
*

Rivkin Radler Distinguished Professor of Law, Hofstra University. B.A., Oberlin College; M.A.,
University of Chicago Divinity School; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M., New York
University School of Law. Thanks to Don Browning for a helpful discussion about his review and to Maxine
Eichner and Elizabeth Glazer for valuable comments on some of the points made in this Essay. I thank Emory
Law Journal for providing a forum for this exchange between Professor Browning and me.
1 LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY
(2006).
2 For this movement’s aims, see COAL. FOR MARRIAGE, FAMILY & COUPLES EDUC. ET AL., THE
MARRIAGE MOVEMENT: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (2000), http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/
marriagemovement.pdf.
3 See generally DON S. BROWNING ET AL., FROM CULTURE WARS TO COMMON GROUND: RELIGION AND
THE AMERICAN FAMILY DEBATE (2d ed. 2000).
4 Don S. Browning, Linda McClain’s The Place of Families and Contemporary Family Law: A Critique
from Critical Familism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1383 (2007).
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organizing theme. “The problem of fatherhood,” or what Browning calls “the
male problematic,” is a central concern of the marriage movement: Marriage
addresses a core societal challenge—binding men to the mothers of the
children they foster and securing men’s paternal investment in those children.5
The problem of fatherhood is also a major topic in Professor Browning’s
review. First, he contends that my critique in The Place of Families of the
marriage movement’s appeals to restore marriage’s role in domesticating men
and women’s role as sexual gatekeepers is too sweeping and does not
adequately appreciate his account of “the male problematic” and of the
purposes of marriage.6
Second, he argues that a limitation of The Place of Families is that it gives
inadequate attention to what he calls “premoral or nonmoral goods” that are
relevant to the well-being of families and children, particularly the “premoral
good of fatherhood.”7 This leaves my approach, he argues, vulnerable to
becoming a sort of indiscriminate acceptance of any and all family forms in the
name of “family diversity”8 or “equality in and between families.”9 Professor
Browning views the supposed limits of my own engagement with this question
of “premoral goods” as illustrative of a broader failing in contemporary family
law and family law theory.10 One aim of his review, thus, is to ask whether
and how theological accounts of contemporary families and the challenges
they face, such as his model of “critical familism,” should inform family law
and policy.11
Third, Browning contends that my book’s supposed inattention to the good
of fatherhood, coupled with my commitment to governmental promotion of
equality within and among families, leads to an approach to family law and
policy that is both too “top down” and too accepting of family diversity.12
According to his view, I am too wary of relying on families and other
institutions of civil society (particularly religious institutions) to generate
virtues and too ready to employ government for the aggressive promotion—in

5 See infra Part I for discussion. Professor Browning introduces the term “male problematic” in
BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 68–69.
6 See Browning, supra note 4, at 1397–99.
7 Id. at 1393, 1394.
8 Id. at 1384.
9 Id. at 1402.
10 Id. at 1384–85.
11 Id. at 1403–05.
12 Id. at 1401–03.
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families—of norms like sex equality.13 Yet, in the name of diversity, I am
overly skeptical of governmental efforts to promote responsible fatherhood and
marriage. This critique raises the question of how my approach and critical
familism differ on the proper relationship among the family, other institutions
of civil society, and the government. Because Professor Browning’s own
“critical familism” is notable within the marriage movement for its affirmation
of the place of sex equality in marriage and family policy, it is worth exploring
whether and how our approaches to sex equality truly differ.
This Essay will first address the contention that my account of “the male
problematic” is itself problematic. I review what The Place of Families
actually says on this matter. It is certainly true that Browning and many others
in the marriage movement focus on the role of the institution of marriage as
encouraging paternal investment. However, it is no caricature to say that at
least some in the marriage movement also invoke the role of women as sexual
gatekeepers to lead men to marriage and, thus, to responsible paternal
investment.
Next, I ask whether The Place of Families contains its own version both of
a “male problematic” and of a “good” of fatherhood. I ponder how that
account compares with that offered in the marriage movement and how it bears
on the problems of family law. In doing so, I also address the charge that The
Place of Families eschews a discussion of the “premoral or nonmoral goods”
at play in the institution of the family. I will explain how my approach to
family law recognizes certain goods of family life as well as important
functions associated with families. Care will be my primary example since
both my approach and critical familism stress the importance of parental care.
I also explain that my commitment to equality within and among families does
not inevitably lead to an indiscriminate pluralism. Here I suggest points of
convergence and divergence with critical familism’s own “marriage plus”
approach.14
Finally, I will offer some preliminary thoughts about Browning’s broader
question about whether and how “critical familism” can contribute to family
law and legal theory about families. In particular, I explain that my project in
The Place of Families, by contrast to Professor Browning’s critical familism
project, was not to synthesize and critically retrieve religious tradition, but to
offer a helpful framework, grounded in family law and liberal and feminist
13
14

Id.
Id.
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political theory, for approaching contentious debates about the place of
families in our political order and a number of issues of family law. My
approach to family law is, by necessity, critical in substantial part because of
the history of family law’s embrace and perpetuation of inequality within the
family. Just as “critical familism” has had to critique as well as synthesize
tradition, feminist theory has had to critically assess traditions of family law as
well as social practices. I reject, however, the charge that my approach is
overly mistrustful of the institutions of civil society.
I. THE “MALE PROBLEMATIC” IN THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT
“The problem of fatherhood,” or what Browning calls “the male
problematic,”15 has been a key theme in writings by the marriage movement.
An influential text in launching the “responsible fatherhood” movement was
David Blankenhorn’s book, Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most
Urgent Social Problem.16 Since the publication of that book in 1995,
Blankenhorn’s Institute for American Values (IAV) has included responsible
fatherhood and marriage as core parts of its agenda. Over the last decade,
Professor Browning’s Religion, Culture, and Family Project has published
many books addressing the issues of marriage and family.17 In 2000, the
Religion, Culture, and Family Project and Blankenhorn’s Institute cosponsored
a document, The Marriage Movement: A Statement of Principles,18 which has
become a reference point for the self-styled “marriage movement.” Writings
sponsored by the marriage movement continually argue that one key function
marriage serves in society is to link fathers, who naturally have a weaker
relationship to children than do mothers, to children.19
Professor Browning contends that my book misunderstands “the link
between marriage and fatherhood,” suggesting that the way I characterize this
link “probably only fits the theory of George Gilder” and certainly does not fit

15
16

BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 68–69.
DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM

(1995).
17

See, e.g., HERBERT ANDERSON ET AL., THE FAMILY HANDBOOK (1998); BROWNING ET AL., supra note

3.
18

COAL. FOR MARRIAGE, FAMILY & COUPLES EDUC. ET AL., supra note 2.
INST. FOR AM. VALUES & INST. FOR MARRIAGE & PUBLIC POLICY, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW: A
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 25–26 (2006), http://law.nd.edu/news/marriagestatement.pdf; INST. FOR AM.
VALUES ET AL., THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW 13 (2005).
19
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Browning’s own views.20 In particular, he states that I mistakenly think that he
and some others in the marriage movement argue “that in marriage, wives
domesticate the erratic and polygamous sexual inclinations of men,” such that
“[women] should be the gatekeeper[s] to sexual access and morality.”21 His
argument, he counters, is not about “the gatekeeping role of woman,” but “the
channeling power of marriage as a public institution. Marriage as an
institution integrates men into the care of their children through the channeling
power of public expectations, legal sanctions, institutional signaling, and,
historically, the religious ideas of sacrament and covenant.”22 The point is to
help to “actualize a father’s capacity for care.”23
Browning helpfully distinguishes between two different arguments about
how to secure responsible fatherhood. The first, which he and some others in
the marriage movement make, is that it is through the institution of marriage
that society attempts to encourage and secure responsible fatherhood.24 Here
they draw on Carl Schneider’s familiar idea of the channelling function of
family law: A basic purpose of family law is to support fundamental social
institutions, like marriage and parenthood, and to steer people into
participating in them.25 For example, family law supports the social institution
of marriage as the proper place for men and women to form exclusive intimate
attachments, reproduce, and parent, and it steers men and women into that
institution. The second argument, which Browning disclaims, is that it is
through the sexual gatekeeping of women (that is, by women exercising sexual
modesty and restraint) that men are led into—channelled into—the institution
of marriage.26
To be sure, Browning’s account of the “male problematic” does not appeal
to the gatekeeping role of women. But The Place of Families does not say that
he does so. Some in the marriage movement do, however, make this sexual
gatekeeping argument, and I do address those arguments in my book. To

20

Browning, supra note 4, at 1395.
Id. at 1394.
22 Id. at 1395.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 498 (1992). I
discuss the relevance of Professor Schneider’s notion of the channelling function to contemporary family law
debates in a recent article. Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the
Channelling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (2007).
26 Browning, supra note 4, at 1395–96.
21
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clarify this point, I will revisit briefly the treatment in The Place of Families of
these two lines of argument.
The Place of Families notes that the problem of fatherhood is one of
several arguments made by the marriage movement as to why society should
restore a marriage culture and why government should shore up the institution
of marriage.27 The book quotes from the testimony before Congress of David
Popenoe, co-director of the National Marriage Project, given in a hearing on
welfare and marriage: “[B]eing a father is universally problematic for men in a
way [that being a mother] is not for women. . . . Marriage is society’s way of
engaging the basic problem of fatherhood—how to hold the father to the
stronger mother-child bond.”28 It refers to Don Browning’s work, noting,
“The marriage movement speaks of a ‘male problematic’ that promoting
marriage is thought to address: men’s inclination toward procreating without
taking responsibility for children.”29 Browning identifies a complementary
“female problematic”—“women’s inclination toward procreating and rearing
children, even in the absence of adequate resources and commitment by fathers
and at the expense of self.”30 A third example offered is the arguments made
in James Q. Wilson’s book, The Marriage Problem.31
Wilson, Browning, and other figures in the marriage movement have
looked to evolutionary science’s teaching about differences in male and female
parental investment as providing evidence of the “male problematic” and
“female problematic.”32 The idea is that men and women have “asymmetric”
reproductive strategies resulting in a naturally greater maternal than paternal
investment in children.33 Evolutionary science, Wilson contends, explains that
men are inclined to “maximize” their reproductive fitness by following a
pattern of having sex with many women, thus producing many children, rather
than being monogamous.34 Browning, similarly, discusses the work of
evolutionary theorist Robert Trivers on parental investment and evolutionary
27

MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 119–20.
Id. at 120 (quoting Welfare and Marriage Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources
of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th Cong. 44–45 (2001) (statement of David Popenoe, co-director of
the National Marriage Project)) (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 135–36 (citing BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 22, 68–69).
30 Id. (citing BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 22, 68–69).
31 Id. (citing JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM 28–31 (2002) (Society creates marriage to
defeat men’s “natural tendency to depart from a relationship with a mother and child,” and to force men to
provide necessary resources.)).
32 See BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 68–69, 106–13; WILSON, supra note 31, at 25–27.
33 See BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 68–69, 106–13.
34 WILSON, supra note 31, at 26.
28
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psychologist David Buss on mate selection preferences.35 The basic idea is
that men are more inclined toward a strategy of multiple sex partners, whereas
women tend to be more selective because they make a far greater investment in
reproduction than do men.36 This follows both from the fact that an egg is far
larger than a sperm and that gestation involves a far greater investment than
ejaculation.37 Moreover, the biological connection between mother and child
is clear in a way that the connection between father and child is not.38
As a shorthand, my book refers to this set of ideas about the problem of
fatherhood as the domestication argument: “[S]ociety requires marriage to
domesticate men”39 or, put otherwise, to “tame” or “civilize” men.40 I raise
several objections to the domestication argument as a justification for
governmental promotion of marriage. First, I argue that “if men need not only
marriage itself but also such hallmarks of traditional marriage as being head of
the household, then promoting this form of marriage directly conflicts with
respecting women’s equality.”41 Here, I am responding to sociologist Steven
Nock’s argument, in Marriage in Men’s Lives, that marriage plays a very
central role in how men establish a sense of masculinity and that one core idea
that most Americans share about marriage is that “[t]he husband is the head,
and principal earner, in a marriage.”42 Although Nock appears to intend the
term “head of household” simply to connote primary earner, studies of gender
roles within marriage, as my book explains, find that “head of household”
connotes leadership and authority within the household.43 I also point to some
ethnographic studies suggesting that when men perceive that they are not
economically able to establish themselves as head of the household, they may
not marry.44
Browning contends that I present an account of the domesticating power of
marriage—and women—that is probably only true of George Gilder.45 To set
35

BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 109–11.
Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 112.
39 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 121, 136.
40 Id. at 135–36.
41 Id. at 136–37.
42 Id. at 135–37 (quoting STEVEN NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 6, 58–59 (1998)).
43 Id. at 137 (discussing the well-known study, PHILLIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN
COUPLES (1983)).
44 Id. at 139 (discussing ideal of the “decent daddy” in ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET 183, 189
(1999)).
45 Browning, supra note 4, at 1395.
36

MCCLAIN FINAL_EMORY

1414

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 05, 2007 7:12 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56

the record straight: I characterize George Gilder as a “conservative welfare
pundit of the 1980s,”46 not as a part of the contemporary marriage movement.
My reference to his ideas is in the context of observing that “[s]ome argue that
men will not accept the role of ‘responsible father’ and husband without the
perks of head of household,”47 namely, “a sense of masculine dominance.”48 I
counter this view by noting that some studies of engaged fathering suggest that
such fatherhood need not rest on household dominance.49 It is in this context
that I state, “Constitutional norms of sex equality forbid government from
using the law to reinforce a model of family responsibilities that installs men as
leaders and providers and women as followers and dependents, or to advance
similar schemes of unequal responsibility.”50 My concern there and here is
with the use of governmental funds to promote “healthy marriage.” I argue
that any governmental funding of marriage education should be consistent with
the constitutional and political value of sex equality.51
I raise other objections to the domestication argument. I note that
“skepticism about appeals to ‘nature’ or to sex differences as a justification for
policy is in order,” in view of the “long history of such appeals to justify sexbased restrictions on women’s citizenship and gender hierarchy in families and
civil society.”52 I also suggest that studies of some men’s practices of
responsible fatherhood outside of marriage “cast doubt on the claim that only
marriage can secure such commitment.”53 I reinforce this last argument by
noting a conclusion in one federally commissioned report that “to the extent
that social policy is constructed through the lens of the traditional nuclear
family model, new forms of responsible fathering by biological fathers or
stepfathers are likely to be constrained.”54
Browning focuses in particular on my criticism that the portrait of men
painted in the domestication argument “insults their capacity to be morally
responsible agents” and “reinforces women’s familiar role as gatekeepers—

46

MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 140.
Id.
48 Id. (quoting GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 136 (1981)).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 137.
51 Id. at 147–54.
52 Id. at 137.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 140 (quoting FED. INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD & FAMILY STATISTICS, NURTURING
FATHERHOOD: IMPROVING DATA AND RESEARCH ON MALE FERTILITY, FAMILY FORMATION AND FATHERHOOD
146 (June 1998), http://fatherhood.hhs.gov/CFSForum/NurturingFatherhood.pdf).
47
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morally responsible for themselves and for men in the areas of sexuality and
family.”55 He suggests that I do not appreciate his distinction between
society’s reliance on the power of the institution of marriage as such in
anchoring men’s paternal investment in offspring and its reliance on sexual
gatekeeping by women to bring men to marriage.56 I do recognize the
distinction, but my point is that both of these lines of argument are made by
figures in the marriage movement. And they have a logical connection, after
all. If the institution of marriage exerts a salutary influence on men by
anchoring paternal care and linking the father to the mother and child, it is
women’s gatekeeping that brings men into marriage itself, instead of pursuing
alternative paths of more unruly, irresponsible sexuality.
Browning does not make the gatekeeping argument but some prominent
figures in the marriage movement do. Marriage movement leader David
Popenoe looks both to the institution of marriage (as explained above)57 and to
the gatekeeping role of women as ways to address the problem of fatherhood.
In pondering what it would take for society to establish a “strong marriage
system,” Popenoe states that this will rest upon a more culturally restrictive
sexual system, which in turn will depend on women’s “leadership” since
women are “traditionally assumed to the gatekeepers of sexuality.”58 While
Popenoe believes that a return to complete sexual restraint before marriage is
probably not feasible in contemporary society, he does suggest that the old
grandmotherly wisdom “dictates a measure of [a woman] playing hard to get,”
such as refusing to cohabit without a clear plan to marry.59
My book discusses Popenoe’s observation about gatekeeping in the context
of a critique of contemporary calls to revive courtship as a better way to steer
young women and men to marriage.60 Courtship is on the marriage movement
agenda. In a report critical of contemporary dating patterns on college
campuses, authors Norval Glenn and Elizabeth Marquardt call for new models
of courtship as a way to provide young women with helpful pathways to
55

Id. at 137.
Browning, supra note 4, at 1395.
57 See supra text accompanying note 28.
58 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 256, 286 (quoting David Popenoe, A Marriage Research Agenda for the
Twenty-First Century: Ten Critical Questions, in REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 195, 197–98 (Alan J. Hawkins et al. eds., 2002)).
59 Id. at 286 (quoting DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT,
SHOULD WE LIVE TOGETHER?: WHAT YOUNG ADULTS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT COHABITATION BEFORE
MARRIAGE 15 (2d ed. 2002)).
60 Id. at 281–89.
56
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marriage.61 My book contends that the current emphasis in federal policy on
abstinence-only-until-marriage sex education and calls by some in the marriage
movement to revive courtship both rely on a notion of women as sexual
gatekeepers.
Sexual gatekeeping by women, for example, is a central element in the call
to revive courtship by Amy and Leon Kass, both participants in the marriage
movement.62 They argue that restoring “sensible sexual mores, pointing
toward marriage” is only possible if a majority of women reassert the virtue of
sexual self-restraint.63 Their writing on courtship treats female chastity as a
“reproductive strategy”—an attempt by a woman to “attach the man
exclusively and permanently to the woman through erotic love and to make
him thereby also love and care for her—their—children.”64 Here, the
complementarity of manly ardor and female modesty work in tandem to bring
men to marriage: Kass and Kass identify as the “central truth about sexual
manners and mores” that “it is women who control and teach them.”65 In this
vein, Leon Kass argues that when female modesty became the “first casualty”
of the sexual revolution, “even women eager for marriage lost their greatest
power to hold and discipline their prospective mates.”66
I do not, therefore, mischaracterize the marriage movement when I observe
that “prominent accounts of courtship assign women a special responsibility
for gatekeeping: women, by exercising their feminine virtue of modesty,
discipline male sexual appetite by insisting on marriage as the prerequisite for
sexual access.”67 Nowhere do I state that this is a uniform view within the
marriage movement or that Browning advances it. But the examples of
Popenoe and of Kass and Kass indicate that within the marriage movement,
some do appeal to restoring sexual gatekeeping by women as a way to bring
back a strong marriage culture.

61

NORVAL GLENN & ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, INST.

FOR

AM. VALUES, HOOKING UP, HANGING OUT,

AND HOPING FOR MR. RIGHT: COLLEGE WOMEN ON DATING AND MATING TODAY 40–41 (2001).
62 See COAL. FOR MARRIAGE, FAMILY & COUPLES EDUC. ET AL., supra note 2, at 27 (showing

that both
Amy and Leon Kass signed The Marriage Movement: A Statement of Principles).
63 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 286 (quoting Amy A. Kass & Leon R. Kass, Proposing Courtship, FIRST
THINGS, Oct. 1999, at 32, 41).
64 Id. at 285–86 (quoting Kass & Kass, supra note 63, at 40).
65 Id. at 285 (quoting Kass & Kass, supra note 63, at 33).
66 Id. at 282 (quoting Leon Kass, The End of Courtship, BOUNDLESS WEBZINE, 2005 http://www.
boundless.org/2005/articles/a0001154.cfm).
67 Id. at 283.
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II. IS THERE A “MALE PROBLEMATIC”—OR A “GOOD” OF FATHERHOOD—IN
THE PLACE OF FAMILIES?
Browning contends that a major limitation of The Place of Families is that
it does not offer an account of the category of what he calls the “premoral” or
“nonmoral goods” of life, including those “relevant to the well-being of
families and children.”68 Indeed, he states that my “distaste” for such a
discussion causes my call for toleration, or what I call toleration as respect,69 to
become “a blanket approval of an indiscriminate variety of life styles.”70
Although my book has “taken law to the doorstep of moral and political
philosophy,” Browning argues, my attempt to bring moral and political theory
to bear on law falls short because I do not augment my theory of justice and
virtue with “indices of the premoral goods [of life] that justice should organize
and virtue should serve.”71 Here, Browning finds my approach illustrative of a
larger-scale weakness in contemporary legal theory about families. Browning
offers the “premoral good of fatherhood”—that is, responsible fatherhood and
paternal care—as his primary example of what he finds missing in The Place
of Families.72
It is difficult to respond to this criticism because I am not certain what
Browning means by the term “premoral goods.” The term is not one found in
contemporary family law or, for that matter, in the political theory on which
my book draws. The absence of “premoral goods” from my book is not,
therefore, due to “distaste” on my part for the concept. Browning explains that
he takes the idea from neo-Thomistic theology and suggests it is similar to the
idea of a “nonmoral good” found in certain moral philosophy.73 He suggests a
distinction between saying something is a good of life, that is, important for
human life, like water, and saying that something is in itself a direct moral
good.74 He maintains that if we say that public authorities “should provide
clear water equally for everyone,” then we are making a moral statement, or
judgment, “about justice or fairness.”75

68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Browning, supra note 4, at 1392.
MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 29–33.
Browning, supra note 4, at 1392.
Id. at 1393.
Id. at 1394.
Id. at 1393.
Id.
Id.
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Trying to relate a term drawn from theology and moral philosophy to the
concerns of family law presents a challenge to my ability to have a
constructive conversation with Professor Browning about this issue. My book
does not use the category “premoral goods,” but it does ask what sorts of goods
are at stake in family life and what functions society expects family to fulfill.
Is there common ground between my approach and critical familism on this
issue? To explore this, I will reformulate Professor Browning’s argument
slightly to assume he might be making this kind of criticism: My proposed
framework for reflecting on contemporary family law and policy fails to offer
an adequate account of the full range of goods that are relevant to family life.
In particular, my book, in Browning’s view, fails to give sufficient weight to
the good of fathers’ care for their children and to the importance of marriage in
securing this care.
The Place of Families proposes an approach to family law that is attentive
to the goods of family life, including the goods of marriage. Early on, I
propose that “[i]n the political order, families are simultaneously a site of
private life and an institution of public importance because of the goods they
foster and the functions they serve.”76 I explain that “[m]y approach to the
place of families and how government should regulate them focuses not only
on the goods associated with families and the functions they serve (for
example, fostering relational responsibility and interdependence), but also on
the relevant political values at stake.”77
What goods, functions, and values are at stake when we speak of families?
Borrowing an idea from John Rawls’s political liberalism, I suggest that a
helpful point of departure is to reflect on political liberalism’s list of “primary
goods” based on “what citizens need and require when they are regarded as
[free and equal] persons and as normal and fully cooperating members of
society over a complete life.”78 I argue that families play a vital role in a
formative project of fostering persons’ capacities for democratic and personal
self-government. Further, I maintain that a focus on primary goods, human
needs, or capacities “suggests at least three tasks for families.”79 Two tasks
that relate to the process of social reproduction—how society reproduces itself
76

MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 22.
Id.
78 Id. at 19 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 178 (1996)). To be sure, The Place of
Families does not attempt to offer a detailed list of the goods of human life, by analogy to Martha Nussbaum’s
account of basic human capabilities. Id.
79 Id. at 20.
77
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by “preparing persons to take their place as capable, responsible, selfgoverning members of society”—are providing care to dependent members
and supporting the political order by cultivating important virtues.80 A third
task is “to afford adults the chance to realize the goods of intimate association”
such as love, intimacy, mutuality, interdependence, and friendship.”81
What political or public values are at stake in the institution of family?
Professor Browning suggests my account is skewed toward an uncritical
embrace of family diversity and the aggressive promotion of sex equality.
However, these are part of a broader family of relevant political values,
resembling those listed by Rawls: “the freedom and equality of women, the
equality of children as future citizens, the freedom of religion, and . . . the
value of the family in securing the orderly production and reproduction of
society and of its culture from one generation to the next.”82 To this list I add
the political value of autonomy in intimate matters and equality among
families.83
Care, then, in my approach is a basic task of families. My book devotes a
chapter to the importance of care—in particular, parental care for children—
and so it seems odd to charge that I ignore the premoral goods of family life.
How do my approach and critical familism compare on the issue of care? How
does the “male problematic” feature in our analyses?
Care, I explain, is foundational and fundamental: “A just society must
ensure that its members are able to meet their basic needs for nurture, care,
food, shelter, and other material goods.”84 Feminist analysis has helpfully
focused attention on care as a precondition for civic and democratic life and
revealed both how society locates the primary responsibility for providing care
in families and how, within families, women continue to have disproportionate
responsibility for providing such care.85 Using the two practical examples of
welfare-to-work policy and work/family or work/life conflict, my book argues
that care should be seen as both a personal (and parental) and public
80

Id.
Id. at 21.
82 Id. at 22 (quoting John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 793
(1997)).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 21.
85 Id. at 21, 89–90 (discussing, for example, MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A
THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 284–87 (2004); Berenice Fisher & Joan Tronto, Toward a Feminist Theory of
Caring, in CIRCLES OF CARE 35, 40 (1990); EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR 29–42 (Emily K. Abel &
Margaret K. Nelson eds., 1999)).
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responsibility and as a public value warranting governmental support.86 I
critique the continuing vestiges of the gendered economy of care, and I urge
that responsibility for care be redistributed between women and men within
families and that employers and government better recognize and support the
work that families do in providing care to their members.87
Using Browning’s framework, I could be saying, in other words, that care
is both a “premoral good” and that it is morally good that society support such
care. Browning and I also seem to have considerable common ground with
respect to the importance of care and society’s interest in securing men’s
participation in providing it. The Place of Families critiques the gendered
division of labor for care giving and points out that this has costs for men as
well as for women and children. I propose to support and recognize care as a
public value in ways that treat care giving as a responsibility for both mothers
and fathers and that facilitate both mothers and fathers integrating family and
work responsibilities. So, too, critical familism advocates that “fathers and
mothers have in principle equal access to the responsibilities and the privileges
of both the public and domestic realms” and calls for a reduced work week.88 I
support a reduced work week along with other policy reforms, and I argue that
society should aim to foster child well-being without sacrificing gender
equality.
How, then, do critical familism and my approach to care and parental
responsibility differ? It is fair to say that critical familism and my approach to
family law have some distinctive concerns. One important difference is that
the motivational question that occupies critical familism and the marriage
movement—i.e., how can society ensure that men will responsibly commit to
their sexual partners and invest in their children?— is not the motivating
concern of my book. Professor Browning’s notion of the “male problematic,”
as noted above, is that society requires marriage as a mechanism to ensure
paternal investment because of men’s tendency not to invest in their offspring.
Indeed, Browning expresses concern that embracing too much family diversity
causes one to lose sight of the preferability of the marital family as the optimal
form for securing such paternal investment in children.89 As a guide to social
policy, his “marriage plus” approach would continue to affirm marriage
between a man and a woman as the normative family form but adopt some
86
87
88
89

Id. at 89–91.
Id. at 88–114.
BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 328.
Browning, supra note 4, at 1401–02.
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social welfare measures to accommodate a certain amount of inevitable family
diversity.90 By contrast, he charges that my approach to fostering not only
equality within families but also equality among families would jeopardize the
special place of marriage in the name of a more indiscriminate acceptance of
diversity, regardless of the impact on paternal investment and thus on
children.91
Equality is, admittedly, a central concern of my book. Indeed, one
motivation for my book was the puzzle that those who call for stronger
families and marriages tend to perceive tension between the goals of
strengthening families and promoting sex equality. But equality is neither the
book’s only animating concern nor an isolated value. My book attempts to
make sense of the common intuition that a significant link exists between the
state of families and the state of the nation. I argue that underlying this
intuition is an important idea: Families have a place in the project of forming
persons into capable, responsible, self-governing citizens.92 My book offers a
framework for thinking about that formative project, stressing three salient
ideas: fostering the capacity for democratic and personal self-government,
fostering equality within and among families, and fostering the responsibility
of individuals to make personal decisions about sexual intimacy, marriage,
reproduction, and parenting.93
To understand better how my approach and critical familism differ, it may
be helpful to tease out how a notion of a “male problematic,” shaped by
feminist sensibilities, features in my book and how this problematic relates to
the problems of family law. Women’s disproportionate responsibility for care
is one manifestation of a feminist “male problematic” identified in my book.
As noted above, I offer proposals for how law and policy can best ameliorate
the gendered economy of care. But there are other manifestations of such a
problematic.
First, reflecting its feminist roots, The Place of Families critiques historical
forms of inequality within the family linked to the hierarchy—sanctioned in
family law and political theory—between husband and wife. Indeed, it argues
that contemporary appeals to the important idea that families are “seedbeds of
civic virtue” often fail to reckon with the history of sex inequality within the
90
91
92
93

Id. at 1400–01.
Id. at 1401–02.
MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 3.
Id. at 4–9.
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family.94 Building on Susan Moller Okin’s influential book, Justice, Gender,
and the Family,95 it identifies lingering forms of such inequality that pose
continuing problems: domestic violence and women’s disproportionate
responsibility for care giving and housework within families. Identifying sex
equality as a constitutional commitment relevant to family life, my book urges
that government should more firmly embrace and support equality between
women and men within families. It explains that a commitment to toleration,
or governmental restraint, does not bar government from addressing the
problem of violence and unjust domination within families.
Second, my book contends that contemporary calls to strengthen families
and promote marriage are too often, at best, ambivalent about sex equality and,
at worst, view greater equality between women and men within families as an
obstacle to securing stable family life. I believe that critical familism has
similar concerns, as evidenced by its criticisms of some religious groups’
embrace of male headship of the family and of a traditional breadwinnercaregiver division of labor as important to strong families.96 I am puzzled,
therefore, that Browning regards my embrace of sex equality as overly
aggressive or zealous and as too mistrustful of civil society’s ability to support
marriage or responsible fatherhood.
What I do say is that if government is to enter into public-private
partnerships with religious organizations to carry out such tasks as promoting
responsible fatherhood, marriage education, and sex education, the
constitutional value of sex equality (to say nothing of the Establishment
Clause) precludes it from funding, or otherwise lending its imprimatur to,
religious conceptions of family that embrace gender hierarchy or a fixed vision
of sex roles (such as women as sexual gatekeepers or men as “head of
household”). I do not argue that these religious groups may not advance those
conceptions in society. Rather, I argue that family law and policy have moved
away from a model of marriage premised on gender hierarchy and fixed roles
for husband and wife. Likewise, it would be wrong for government to enlist
private actors to promote marriage by promoting such visions of family life. In
other words, if government is to attempt to promote “healthy marriage,” it
must do so without promoting patriarchy. What is more, I have argued,
drawing in part on Browning’s own work, that a prudent way to support

94
95
96

MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 50–84.
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989).
BROWNING ET AL., supra note 3, at 219–46.
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“healthy marriage” would be to recognize the important link between
perceptions of marriage quality and sex equality.97
Third, equality among families is a concern of The Place of Families. It is
here, perhaps, that my approach and critical familism—and the marriage
movement, more generally—may diverge the most. In contrast to the marriage
movement, I strongly support extending marriage to same-sex couples. I do
this not due to an indiscriminate embrace of diversity, but rather based on an
argument appealing to the goods of family life, the capacities of gay men and
lesbians, and relevant political values.98 Another proposal I make, of which
Professor Browning is quite critical, is to develop a registration system, which
would allow persons in close relationships to have a formal status attached to
some set of benefits, obligations, and protections. I do not say, contrary to his
critique, that all close relationships should receive the protective umbrella
linked to marriage; rather, I contend that government may legitimately
calibrate the menu of rights to the menu of responsibilities to which partners
agree.99 My argument here, again, rests not on an indiscriminate embrace of
diversity. Instead, I ask whether such relationships “have not only private
significance (for their contribution to personal happiness and well-being), but
also public significance, rooted in important social goods they realize and
functions they serve (such as meeting dependencies, giving care, or fostering
civic virtues).”100 A genuine disagreement between my approach and that of
critical familism is whether this sort of move “beyond marriage” would
undermine marriage, weaken paternal investment, and be harmful to children’s
well-being.101
A final form of inequality among families that is of concern to me as well
as to Professor Browning is the fact that some men and women aspire to marry
but do not because of economic factors. Like the marriage movement, I, too,
am concerned that economic inequality is a barrier to marriage and that there
may be a “marriage gap” between the affluent and the poor. A related problem
is that economic disadvantage and other forms of inequality contribute to early

97 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 153–54; see Don S. Browning, What Kind of Love? The Equal-Regard
Marriage and Children, 4 AMER. EXPERIMENT QUART. 47 (2001).
98 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 155–90.
99 Id. at 209.
100 Id. at 197.
101 For example, about forty percent of cohabiting households include children, and I argue that a
registration option might help to contribute to the stability of the adult relationships, and thus, to such
children’s well-being. Id. at 198, 207–08.
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pregnancy and parenthood.102 But here I diverge from the marriage movement
and from governmental efforts to promote “healthy marriage” in at least two
respects. These bear on the issue of a “male problematic.” First, I argue that
concerns not only about economics but also about relationship quality deter
some low-income women from marrying. Research on low-income unmarried
parents finds that a significant obstacle to stable family life is gender conflict
or gender distrust. This distrust relates to quality issues like infidelity,
violence, and whether marriage will be premised on an equal partnership rather
than male dominance. This might be cast as a form of a “male problematic.”
As some researchers concluded, if “healthy marriage” programs seek to
encourage women’s positive attitudes toward marriage and reduce their
distrust, this “may well require men to change the behavior that leads to
distrust or negative attitudes.”103 Relational conflict and violence are among
the reasons for this distrust. Moreover, state-wide surveys conducted with
welfare funds as part of marriage promotion initiatives find both that women
more than men, and lower-income people more than the affluent, identify
violence as a significant factor leading to divorce.104
Browning comments that I miss the point that women in marriages are at
lower risk for domestic violence than women in cohabiting or dating
relationships.105 But my point was not this comparative one. Rather, it was
that, given that gender distrust is an obstacle to marriage and that violence
within marriage is a significant factor leading to divorce, for women and for
low-income partners, efforts to promote “healthy marriage” that focus
primarily on improving unmarried men’s economic prospects to make them
more “marriageable” do not go far enough. Concern for the quality of family
life and of marital relationships—which relates in turn to equality within
marriage—should be treated as equally important.
Moreover, some
researchers have proposed that a path to greater marriageability would be
greater acceptance of nontraditional family roles for men, such as active
nurturing, especially for men with lower earning capacity.106
A second point of tension between my own approach and that of the
marriage movement is whether marriage promotion should be the primary
102

Id. at 263–68.
Id. at 332 n.93 (quoting Marcia Carlson, Sara McLanahan & Paula England, Union Formation in
Fragile Families, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 237, 255–57 (2004)).
104 Id. at 132–33 (citing state-wide surveys in Oklahoma and Utah).
105 Browning, supra note 4, at 1399.
106 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 140.
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focus of helping low-income unmarried parents. For example, a serious
question for welfare law and policy is whether efforts to promote responsible
fatherhood should support only social services that emphasize marital
fatherhood as the only form of responsible fatherhood. I support marriage
education, but I also concur with those scholars who argue for seeking to
strengthen families as they actually exist. Research on “fragile families,” a
term used to describe low-income, unmarried parents who have separated
parenthood from marriage, finds that the gap between such couples’ ideals
about marriage and actual practices rests in part on a combination of economic
and other obstacles to marriage.107 However, most of these mothers and
fathers—whether or not they have a current romantic involvement with each
other—do value having the fathers’ continuing involvement in the child’s
life.108 Governmental efforts that go beyond marriage education to include a
broader spectrum of supportive programs could help to encourage responsible
fatherhood and cooperative parenting even if they are not anchored within
marriage.
Would critical familism’s “marriage plus” approach concur with
approaches that help actual families as they presently exist, or would it worry
that such an approach would weaken the institution of marriage? The marriage
movement focuses on marriage as the crucial societal mechanism for securing
paternal investment. Here, by contrast, the argument is made that encouraging
active, nurturing fatherhood by young men—whether they are married or
unmarried—may be an effective mechanism for improving adult-adult
relationships. As one report commissioned by the federal government posed
the question, “Can increasing men’s commitment to active fathering be a
mechanism for improving union quality and stability?”109 Critical familism
might well counter that society should aspire to link marriage and parenthood
more tightly. But whatever the normative ideals that undergird family law,
family law and welfare policy have to meet people in the actual circumstances
in which they currently live. If marriage is not an appropriate goal for some
men and women, programs seeking to improve parenting skills and the
coparenting relationship could at least strengthen family life for families as
107

See generally Center for Research on Child Wellbeing, http://crcw.princeton.edu (last visited Feb. 11,

2007).
108 See RON MINCY ET AL., TEMP. ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY FAMILIES (“TANF”), FRAGILE FAMILIES IN
FOCUS: A LOOK AT HOW NEVER-MARRIED, LOW-INCOME PARENTS PERCEIVE MARRIAGE AND RELATIONSHIPS
(2004) (explaining a recent study commissioned by Louisiana’s TANF).
109 MCCLAIN, supra note 1, at 140 (quoting DAVID J. FEIN, THE DETERMINANTS OF MARRIAGE AND
COHABITATION AMONG DISADVANTAGED AMERICANS: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND NEEDS 37 (2003)).
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they currently exist.110 A comprehensive approach to services could help those
couples for whom “healthy marriage” is a desired outcome as well as couples
who, although they would make poor marriage partners, could more easily
move to a healthy coparenting relationship and thus more stable family life.111
CONCLUSION
My project and critical familism share a common point of departure:
concern over the contentious public debates in the United States over families.
However, the aim of The Place of Families, by contrast to Professor
Browning’s project, was not to synthesize and critically retrieve religious
tradition, but rather it was to offer a framework, grounded in family law and
political theory, for approaching contentious debates about the place of
families in our political order and a number of issues of family law. In his
review, Professor Browning gestures toward a larger question that he invites
family law scholars—and legal scholars, as a more general matter—to take up:
what is “the relation of religion to the law in a pluralistic and democratic
society?”112
In an earlier exchange with me about critical familism, Professor Browning
argued that “positions on family theory informed by explicitly religious
sources have the right to enter into deliberations aimed to shape public policy,”
provided that they “advance their arguments in publicly accessible ways.”113
As I observed in response, his premise that, out of engagement with and
critical retrieval of classic texts about marriage in the Western tradition (and
non-Western religious traditions), there “would emerge a public philosophy
about marriage on which there would be widespread cultural agreement has
some resemblance to political liberalism’s appeal to an overlapping consensus,
where persons can draw upon their comprehensive moral views to find
agreement about important political principles or public values.”114 The Place
of Families draws on this dimension of political liberalism. However,
Professor Browning seems to quest for a comprehensive public moral
110 Id. Given the high rates of unintended pregnancies experienced by unmarried, low-income couples,
programs aimed at sex education, pregnancy prevention, and family planning would also be helpful. See
MINCY ET AL., supra note 108, at 4–5.
111 MINCY ET AL., supra note 108, at 17–18.
112 Browning, supra note 4, at 1384.
113 Don Browning, Critical Familism, Civil Society, and the Law, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 313, 316 (2003).
114 Linda C. McClain, Intimate Affiliation and Democracy: Beyond Marriage?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379,
396 (2003).
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philosophy about marriage, which takes its values and moral claims from
religious texts, and seems to blur the distinctions between civil and religious
marriage.
This fusion of the civil and religious is clear, for example, in the recent
statement, Marriage and the Public Good: Ten Principles, to which Professor
Browning was a signatory. Marriage and the Public Good expresses, as one
principle, that “‘[c]ivil marriage’ and ‘religious marriage’ cannot be rigidly or
completely divorced from one another”; it aims to “preserve some shared idea
of what marriage is that transcends the differences between religious and
secular marriages and between marriages within our nation’s many diverse
religious traditions.”115 I contend that it is not an appropriate task for the state
to pursue or seek to implement such a comprehensive philosophy, given the
reasonable diversity of views among people about sexuality, family, and
marriage, including diversity within specific religious traditions. Nor is it
appropriate for legislatures and courts, when regulating and adjudicating
marriage as a civil institution, to aim to advance a religious conception of
marriage.
Undeniably, religious conceptions of marriage have shaped contemporary
family law. Thus, a complicating factor in considering the place of religion in
family law in a pluralistic constitutional democracy is that, although
contemporary discourse about marriage emphasizes that civil marriage, as
distinct from religious marriage, is, in a sense, a creature of state law and
regulation,116 America’s history reveals the strong influence of Christian
conceptions of marriage on the secular law.117 Indeed, in the informative
volume coedited by Browning, American Religions and the Family, the late
Lee Teitelbaum observed, “For a considerable part of American history, the
posture of public authority was consistent with positions taken by the dominant
religious culture . . . . For most of American history, . . . the law of marriage
was consistent with and supported—if not created—by the views of dominant
religious communities.”118 Yet Teitelbaum further observes the
disestablishment of religious and civil family law. “[S]ince the 1950s this
115 THE WITHERSPOON INST., MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: TEN PRINCIPLES 14 (2006),
http://www.princetonprinciples.org/files/Marriage%20and%20the%20Public%20Good.pdf.
116 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003).
117 A helpful source is JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND
LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (1997).
118 Lee E. Teitelbaum, Religion and Modernity in American Family Law, in AMERICAN RELIGIONS AND
THE FAMILY: HOW FAITH TRADITIONS COPE WITH MODERNIZATION AND DEMOCRACY 227, 228–29 (Don S.
Browning & David A. Clairmont eds., 2007).
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close association of dominant religious views and marriage laws has weakened
dramatically” (as the tension between the religious ideal of marital permanence
and the advent of no-fault divorce illustrates).119
An intriguing question arising out of the consideration of this history of the
intertwining and disentangling of family law and religion is what the
conception of civil marriage is and whether various religious communities find
this understanding of marriage compatible with or threatening to their own
conception of marriage. As Mary Anne Case has observed, what “marriage
licenses” today is quite different from what it licensed in an earlier era, when
marriage entailed a hierarchical set of rights and duties of husband and wife
(baron and feme) and the criminal law prohibited nonmarital, nonprocreative,
and nonheterosexual sexual expression.120 Today, by contrast, much of that
criminal law has given way to understandings of a realm of constitutionally
protected liberty and privacy. And, pursuant to the transformation of family
law spurred by the Supreme Court’s series of equal protection rulings,
although civil marriage does entail certain rights and obligations, they are
stated in gender-neutral terms. Spouses are much freer to choose how to live
their marital life, and the rules of exit are far less strict.
What civil marriage licenses, thus, is, no doubt, at considerable odds with
at least some religious conceptions of marriage. In taking up Professor
Browning’s question about the place of religion in shaping family law, we
need to give attention to possible points of tension between these civil and
religious conceptions. For example, I suspect that one point of tension will be
the issue of gender roles in the family. Contemporary family law has rejected
the common law’s model of husbandly rule and wifely obedience. In The
Place of Families, I contend that sex equality is an important political value
and constitutional principle as well as a commitment of family law. In
Browning’s new anthology,121 a theme in nearly every chapter is that a
traditional tenet in religious understandings of the home and family is that men
are to exercise authority or leadership in the home (e.g., “headship”) and that
women have special duties in the home, including (in some traditions) some
form of submission to or respect for male authority. In coping with
modernization, religious leaders and religious adherents face the challenge of
how to reconcile traditional religious beliefs about male authority in the family
119

Id. at 230.
Mary Anne Case, Lecture, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758 (2005).
121 AMERICAN RELIGIONS AND THE FAMILY: HOW FAITH TRADITIONS COPE WITH MODERNIZATION
DEMOCRACY, supra note 118.
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with contemporary American values about equality of the sexes and marriage
as a partnership. To be sure, some religious traditions themselves have moved
away from teachings about male dominance and female submission and fixed
gender roles to more egalitarian visions of marriage and family. Critical
familism, similarly, advocates an egalitarian vision. By contrast, some
embrace traditional gender roles as part of an “oppositional” stance to
American culture and the perceived weakening of family values.122
The issue of diverse religious views about gender roles and the degree to
which they support or oppose contemporary family law is but one of a number
of issues raised by Professor Browning’s quest to bring religion to bear on
shaping family law and policy. I welcome critical familism’s further
engagement with the problems of family law.

122 See Margaret Bendroth, Evangelicals, Family, and Modernity, in AMERICAN RELIGIONS AND
FAMILY: HOW FAITH TRADITIONS COPE WITH MODERNIZATION AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 118, at 56.
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